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I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs/Respondents State of Idaho and Idaho State Tax Commission (the "Plaintiffs")
and Defendant/Appellant Native Wholesale Supply Company ("NWS") essentially agree on the
facts of this case. Those facts are as follows:
NWS is chartered under the tribal code of the Sac and Fox Tribe. (R. p. 121). NWS's
president and sole owner is Arthur Montour, a tribal member of the Seneca Nation. (R. p. 120).
NWS's principal place of business is located on the Seneca Nation reservation. (R. pp. 121-22).
NWS has no presence in the State of Idaho, nor does it advertise or solicit in Idaho. (R. p. 122).
NWS only sells cigarettes to tribes or entities located on tribal land and owned by Indians. (R. p.
121). All cigarettes are sold by NWS with title and risk of loss transferred to the purchaser at the
time of the sale on the Seneca Nation reservation, which is located within the boundaries of the
State of New York. (R. p. 122). NWS does not exercise any control over its products subsequent
to their sale to third parties. ([d.).
Warpath, Inc., an Idaho corporation, is owned by registered members of the Coeur
d' Alene tribe. (R. p. 456). Warpath's articles of incorporation prohibit anyone other than Coeur
d' Alene tribal members from owning an interest in the company. (R. p. 456). Warpath's only
location is on the Coeur d' Alene reservation, in Plummer, Idaho. (R. pp. 456,458). Warpath is
the only cigarette retailer within the geographic boundaries of Idaho which purchased cigarettes
fromNWS.
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The terms of the sale between NWS and Warpath were FOB! Seneca Nation and the
cigarettes were marked "for reservation sales only." (R. pp. 121-22). The cigarettes that were
sold to Warpath were held in the Foreign Trade Zone in Las Vegas, Nevada prior to their sale to
Warpath on the Coeur d' Alene reservation. (R. p. 793). Warpath is the only customer NWS has
on the Coeur d'Alene reservation, and NWS has never sold cigarettes to any other customer in
Idaho.
Based upon these facts, Plaintiffs argue that NWS violated the Master Settlement
Agreement Act ("MSAA"),2 Idaho Code §§ 39-7801, et seq., the Idaho Master Settlement
Agreement Complementary Act (the "Complementary Act"), Idaho Code §§ 39-8401, et seq.,
and the Idaho Cigarette Tax Act, Idaho Code §§ 63-2501, et seq., by selling cigarettes in Idaho
that are not listed on Idaho's Compliant Tobacco Manufacturer Directory. NWS submits that
when controlling law is applied to the undisputed facts it is clear that the Complementary Act
and Cigarette Tax Act are preempted in this case, that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, and that Idaho lacks personal jurisdiction over NWS.

II.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

This case is one piece of a larger dispute involving the applicability or non-applicability
of the Tobacco Master Settlement statues in various states to cigarette sales implicating Native
Americans. (R. p. 667). In the underlying settlement with the large tobacco manufactures and

1 The terms "FOB" means "fee on board," and is the place where title passes from NWS to Warpath. Idaho Code §
28-2-319. The FOB Seneca Nation in this case means that title passed from NWS in New York.
2 NWS agrees that Plaintiffs cannot show a violation of the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement Act ("MSA"),
I.c.§ 39-7801. References to the MSA are included to provide a complete picture of the regulatory framework that
applies to the Complementary Act. (See Appellant's Brief, p. 22).
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the States, large tobacco manufactures are entitled to reduce their payments to the States if the
States are not aggressively pursuing enforcement of settlement statutes against non-participating
manufactures. (See R. pp. 676-736). In order to enforce such statutes, States, including Idaho,
are now attempting to directly regulate Indian manufactures and sellers of tobacco products
located on reservations. (R. p. 669). This regulation is nothing more than an attempt to keep
large tobacco manufactures from reducing their payments to the States under the Tobacco Master
Settlement statutes. As discussed below, however, while the U.S. Supreme Court permits limited
taxation of tobacco sales to non-Indians located on-reservation, the Court has never allowed the
direct regulation by States of on-reservation commerce that is limited to Indians. Here, Plaintiffs
are attempting to abrogate these rules simply to receive more money from large tobacco
manufactures.

A.

NWS Was Not Required to Obtain a Cigarette Wholesale Tax Permit under the
Cigarette Tax Act.
Plaintiffs first argue that "NWS has never held, let alone applied for, a cigarette

wholesale tax permit which is required by Idaho Code Section 63-2503(1)." (Respondent's
Brief, p. 9). Plaintiffs, however, fail to realize that NWS is not required to obtain a wholesale tax
permit under the Cigarette Tax Act.
The Cigarette Tax Act provides that wholesale permits "shall be held only by persons
actively engaged in making wholesale sales of cigarettes subject to tax under this chapter." I.C.
§ 63-2503(3). However, the Idaho Cigarette and Tobacco Products Tax Administrative Rules

provide cigarette wholesalers may deliver cigarettes without Idaho tax stamps to Idaho Indian
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reservations when: "The purchaser is a business enterprise wholly owned and operated by an
enrolled member or members of an Idaho Indian Tribe." IDAPA § 35.01.1O.014.01(b). As
NWS argued below, the Cigarette Tax Act does not apply to NWS because it only sold to an
entity located on the reservation that is wholly owned by a tribal member. (R. p. 115,414,440,
532-33, 784-85). Thus, NWS is not required to hold a wholesale tax permit, nor could it hold
one.

B.

The Complementary Act and the Cigarette Tax Ace are Preempted.
1.

The conduct being regulated is solely on-reservation.

Plaintiffs predicate a large portion of their argument on the following statement: "it is
settled that a State can regulate activities of tribal members that are off reservation."
(Respondent's Brief, p. 13). NWS does not generally dispute this principle, but NWS does
dispute that it applies here.
While Plaintiffs do not directly contend that the Complementary Act or the Cigarette Tax
Act is limited to regulating NWS's off-reservation conduct, Plaintiffs strongly imply that such is
the case in the hopes that this Court will uphold the district court's decisions. However, any
argument that Plaintiffs are attempting to regulate NWS' s off-reservation conduct is contradicted
by the record.
It is undisputed that NWS's principal place of business is located on the Seneca Nation

reservation. (R. pp. 121). Further, NWS only sells the cigarettes to tribes or entities located on-

3 As noted above, NWS submits that the Cigarette Tax Act is not applicable in this case because NWS is not
required to hold a wholesale tax permit. Even if this is not the case, the Cigarette Tax Act is still preempted by
federal law based upon the undisputed facts of record.
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reservation. (ld.). In Idaho, NWS only sold cigarettes to a single Indian customer located on a
reservation. 4 (ld.).

There are simply no facts whereby NWS conducted any off-reservation

activities.
Plaintiffs are seeking to use the Complementary Act and the Cigarette Tax Act to regulate
NWS's on-reservation conduct. This fact is crucial to note because "[w]hen on-reservation
conduct involving only Indians is at issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the state's
regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the federal interest in encouraging tribal selfgovernment is at its strongest." State v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, 534, 224 P.3d 1109, 1123
(2010).

Despite Plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary, the relevant law holds that Idaho's

regulatory interest is minimal and the federal interest is at its strongest because all conduct in this
case occurs on-reservation.

2.

Because the conduct being regulated is on-reservation, the "Bracker" test is
applicable.

In its initial brief, NWS submitted that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment to the Plaintiffs because the district court did not employ the balancing test set forth in

White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980). The Bracker test is a factually
driven inquiry that can rarely be resolved on summary judgment. Plaintiffs' argue that Bracker
is inapplicable, which argument is premised on the fallacy that the conduct being regulated is
off-reservation.

4 As noted throughout this brief, long-standing Idaho precedent holds that businesses exclusively owned by tribal
members are considered Indians.
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The Bracker balancing test involves a "particularized inquiry into the nature of the state,
federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether in the specific
context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law." /d. at 145. The district court
did not employ the Bracker test below because it incorrectly determined that the Complementary
Act and the Cigarette Tax Act regulated "off-reservation conduct." (R. p. 1072).
Plaintiffs first argue that the Bracker test does not apply "because NWS's sales and
shipments of cigarettes to a retail business in Idaho extend beyond the boundaries of the
reservation where NWS is located." (Respondent's Brief, p. 17). This statement is a classic
straw-man argument. The critical fact is not NWS's location on a reservation, but that Plaintiffs
seek to regulate on-reservation conduct in Idaho.

Plaintiffs' argument is based on NWS's

location, rather than properly analyzing where the conduct at issue takes place. This analytical
defect undermines Plaintiffs' arguments that the Bracker test does not apply in this case.
Next, Plaintiffs argue that the Bracker test does not apply because NWS is a corporation,
not a tribal member. Id. This statement directly contradicts this Court's holding in Mahoney v.
State, 96 Idaho 59, 524 P.2d 187 (1973), that businesses exclusively owned by tribal members

are considered Indians in analyzing whether Idaho can regulate a transaction. Id. at 61,524 P.2d
at 189 (holding the state could not tax cigarettes sold by a business owned by Coeur d'Alene
member). Mahoney directs that NWS, while a corporation, is an Indian because it is owned
exclusively by a tribal member.
After devoting less than one page to analyzing whether the Bracker test is applicable,
Plaintiffs then argue that if the test were applied it would not per se bar Plaintiffs from regulating
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the on-reservation conduct in this case. While NWS will address the points raised by Plaintiffs,
it must be reiterated that the Bracker test requires a comprehensive factual inquiry that did not
take place at the summary judgment stage. Further, if the district court properly employed the
Bracker test at summary judgment, all disputed facts would have to have been resolved in

NWS's favor as the non-moving party.5 Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c).
With respect to the federal interest at stake, Plaintiffs cite two federal laws as evidence
that the federal government generally supports State regulation of cigarette sales. (Respondent's
Brief, p. 17). The first law is 42 U.S.c. § 300x-26, which encourages states to adopt laws that
prohibit sales of tobacco products to persons under the age of 18. /d. The second law is the
"Jenkins Act," which mandates that "out-of-state cigarette retailers report monthly to a State's
tax or revenue commission all sales made to residents of the tax commission's state."
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 17-18).

Based upon these laws, Plaintiffs argue that "federal law

supports, not undercuts, state regulation of cigarette sales and shipments." (Respondent's Brief,
p. 18). This conclusion is misguided.
First, encouraging states to adopt laws prohibiting sales of tobacco to minors has
absolutely no bearing on whether Idaho may regulate strictly on-reservation activities. Second,
the Jenkins Act only applies to shipments of cigarettes to individuals who are not distributors
licensed by or located in the State-it also has no bearing on the regulation of on-reservation
activities. 15 U.S.C. § 376(a). Neither law overrides or addresses that "[w]hen on-reservation
conduct involving only Indians is at issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the state's
This Court must also use the same standards properly employed by the district court originally ruling on the
motion. Goodman Oil Co. of Lewiston v. Idaho State Tax Comm, 136 Idaho 53, 55,28 P.3d 996, 998 (2001).

5
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regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the federal interest in encouraging tribal selfgovernment is at its strongest." Maybee, 148 Idaho at 534, 224 P.3d at 1123. This law, coupled
with the summary judgment standards and the fact that the conduct being regulated involves onreservation Indians, should lead to a finding that the federal interest involved is at its highest and
Idaho's interest is minimal.
The laws aimed at protecting minors and tracking cigarette sales are not even remotely
similar to the purpose of the Complementary Act. As Plaintiffs admit, the Master Settlement
Agreement statutes the States entered into were "to prevent a cost advantage to the NonParticipating Manufactures," such as NWS. (R. p. 119). The Complementary Act effectuates
this goal by requiring Non-Participating Manufactures to either be bound by the MSA or to
"escrow specific amounts based upon each 'Unit Sold' in the State." (R. p. 119). If Idaho does
not aggressively enforce the Complementary Act against Non-Participating Manufactures, such
as NWS, then large tobacco manufactures who entered into the MSA are entitled to reduce their
payments to the States. (See R. pp. 676-736). Essentially, Plaintiffs are seeking to enforce the
Complementary Act against NWS in an attempt to keep large tobacco manufactures from
reducing their payments to Idaho under the Tobacco Master Settlement statutes-which has no
connection at all to protecting minors from tobacco.

Plaintiffs' arguments that the federal

statutes they cite to support the "state regulation of cigarette sales and shipments" is misleading
because protecting MSA payments from big tobacco has nothing to do with the health of minors.
Plaintiffs next argue that the tribal interests at stake do not weigh in NWS's favor
because the regulation in this case "is no more intrusive on NWS's time and resources than the
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record-keeping and tax collection duties approved" in other cases. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 1819). Even though there are no facts in the record regarding the tribal interests at stake-because
this issue was not fully developed at summary judgment-it is self-evident that both the Coeur
d' Alene Indian reservation and the Seneca Nation would strongly assert that the taxation of
solely on-reservation conduct is intrusive. It seems disingenuous for Plaintiffs to argue that the
tribal interests at stake are minimal in this case as the regulation of on-reservation conduct would
clearly be of paramount concern to the tribes involved.
In short, the district court erred in not applying the Bracker test at summary judgment.
While the record is not fully developed, weighing the evidence in the light most favorable to
NWS, the federal, state and tribal interests involved under the Bracker test would support a
finding that the Complementary Act and the Cigarette Tax Act violate federal law in this case.
3.

The Complementary Act and the Cigarette Tax Act, as applied to Indians on
reservations, are preempted by federal law.

NWS submits that Idaho's regulatory scheme for the sale of tobacco products in Indian
Country has been preempted by the Indian Commerce Clause and other of federal law . Plaintiffs
acknowledge that preemption issues exist, but Plaintiffs dispute that either the Complementary
Act or the Cigarette Tax Act is preempted because NWS introduced "tobacco into Idaho."
(Respondent's Brief, p. 14).

Plaintiffs further argue that this Court's decision in Maybee

somehow supports this argument despite the fact that Maybee is clearly not on point. It is
respectfully submitted that Plaintiffs' arguments are misplaced.
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The Indian Commerce Clause provides Congress with plenary power to legislate in the
field of Indian affairs. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989). The
key factor in determining whether a regulation or tax is preempted by federal law under the
Indian Commerce Clause is whether the legal incidence of the law falls upon an Indian or upon a
non-Indian. Oklahoma Tax Comm. v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450,458 (1995). Where the
U.S. Supreme Court has allowed state regulation of tobacco, the legal incidence fell on nonIndians. Id. at 459 (If the legal incidence falls on non-Indians and the balance of federal, state,
and tribal interests favors the state, then the state may impose a regulation with minimal
burdens.).
The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently followed this U.S. Supreme Court precedent
and placed emphasis on where the legal burden of the regulation falls. Goodman Oil Co. of
Lewiston v. Idaho State Tax Comm., 136 Idaho 53, 60, 28 P.3d 996, 1003 (2001) ("If the legal

incidence of an excise tax rests on a tribe or on tribal members for sales made inside Indian
Country, the tax cannot be enforced absent clear congressional authorization."); Mahoney, 96
Idaho at 64,524 P.2d at 192 ("the incidence of the tax falls squarely upon sales by an Indian on a
reservation; this tax is nothing less than a direct tax upon commerce with the Indian tribes, and
'such taxation is not permissible absent congressional consent "').

As this Court noted in

Maybee, a state cannot regulate Indian Country activity where such regulation is preempted by

federal law, and states may not infringe on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them. Maybee, 148 Idaho at 533, 224 P.3d at 1122 (citing Bracker, 448
U.S. at 142).
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In its initial brief, NWS demonstrated that the legal incidence of the Complementary Act

does not fall upon the consumer, but on wholesalers, such as NWS. Plaintiffs do not dispute this
fact or even address it in their brief. NWS further demonstrated that the legal incidence of both
the Complementary Act and the Cigarette Tax Act fall squarely on Indians (like NWS). In
response, Plaintiffs argue that the triggering event in this case was the "introduction of tobacco
into Idaho," which somehow makes the tax imposed by the Complementary Act and the
Cigarette Tax Act acceptable despite the holdings in Goodman Oil and Maybee. Plaintiffs base
this argument on Wagnon v. Prairie Band Poawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005), which is
inapposite.
In Wagnon, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the imposition of a state fuel tax on an off-

reservation distributor with respect to on-reservation purchases. However, the tribe in Wagnon
acknowledged that "the legal incidence of the tax [was] imposed on [the tribe's] non-Indian
distributor" and was "triggered by the distributor's receipt of fuel outside the reservation." Id. at
105 (emphasis in original). The U.S. Supreme Court observed that the tax provision in question
stated that "'the incidence of this tax is imposed on the distributor, '" which was clearly a nonIndian. Id at 106 (citation omitted). Plainly, Wagnon is not on point.
NWS is exclusively owned by an Indian, and it is settled that businesses exclusively
owned by tribal members are considered Indians in analyzing whether Idaho can regulate the
transaction. Mahoney, 96 Idaho at 61, 524 P.2d at 189. Further, NWS is not engaging in any
conduct in the State of Idaho occurring "outside the reservation." Plaintiffs' attempt to paint the
triggering event as being NWS' s introduction of cigarettes in Idaho is bizarre given that there are
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no facts even suggesting that NWS transported, sold or distributed cigarettes in any place in
Idaho except for on-reservation.
Plaintiffs next argue that Maybee is persuasive because "the Indian status of NWS's
owner ... does not somehow immunize NWS ... with respect to its illegal cigarettes" sold to
Warpath, Inc. (Respondent's Brief, p. 16). This misses the point. In Maybee, the defendant sold
his cigarettes over the internet and sent cigarettes to consumers who were located offreservation. 6 This Court specifically noted in the Maybee decision that "the Acts do not

regulate ... on-reservation activities," but instead regulated the defendant's "off-reservation
conduct of: (1) selling, and offering for sale, Noncompliant Cigarettes in Idaho." Maybee, 148
Idaho at 534, 224 P.3d at 1123 (emphasis added). Here, both the Complementary Act and the
Cigarette Tax Act attempt to regulate solely on-reservation conduct.

Accordingly, the legal

incidence rests fully on a tribe or on tribal members for sales made inside Indian Country, which
is improper under well-established Idaho law.
This Court has held that in analyzing a state statute to determine whether it violates the
Indian Commerce Clause it is crucial to determine: (1) whether the regulated conduct occurs on
or off a reservation; (2) whether the party being regulated is a tribal member; and (3) if the
conduct being regulated does occur on a reservation, whether State interests outside the
reservation are implicated. Id. at 534, 224 P.3d at 1123. It is undisputed that the regulated
Plaintiffs admit that the defendant in Maybee "sold his cigarettes to people throughout Idaho," including to nonIndians off-reservation, whereas "NWS only sold its cigarettes to an Idaho corporation located on a reservation in
Idaho." (Respondent's Brief, p. 16, n. 12). Plaintiffs, however, state that this "is a distinction without a difference"
under Plaintiffs' subject jurisdiction analysis. Id. Curiously, Plaintiffs fail to discuss this distinction in their
preemption analysis. (see id. at pp. 19-23). NWS submits that this distinction is crucial in the preemption analysis,
and Plaintiffs' failure to address this distinction highlights its importance.
6
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conduct at issue here occurred on a reservation and the parties being regulated are tribal
members. Therefore, the district court should have analyzed whether Idaho's off-reservation
interests are implicated. Rather than making such an analysis, the district court incorrectly
determined that the activities constitute off-reservation conduct similar to the Maybee case (R. p.
1072, 1. 12). This was clearly in error, and for this reason the district court's decision granting
summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs must be overturned.
Finally, had the district court correctly analyzed whether Idaho's interests outside the
reservation are implicated, the record required that this question be answered in the negative.
Plaintiffs' entire argument is predicated on the purchase of one pack of cigarettes and the
purchase of two cartons of cigarettes. (R. pp. 1165-66). Both purchases occurred on-reservation
by an employee of the State. [d. These minimal facts, by themselves, do not support any finding
that Idaho's interests outside the reservation are implicated because both sales occurred onreservation. 7

Further, there is no evidence that NWS transported, distributed or sold any

cigarettes in Idaho off-reservation. There simply are no facts that implicate Idaho's interests
outside the reservation. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting summary judgment in
favor of Plaintiffs and denying NWS' s Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the
Complementary Act and the Cigarette Tax Act are preempted by Federal law.

It must be noted that Plaintiffs attempt to show that "NWS's cigarettes sales have off-reservation effects" by citing
to the numbers of cigarettes NWS sold on-reservation and the number of Indians living on the Coeur d' Alene
Reservation. (Respondent's Brief, p. 31, n. 22). It is respectfully submitted that this argument is purely speculation
and not proper for summary judgment.
7
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4.

The Idaho cases cited by NWS are on point.

After failing to adequately address NWS's points on preemption and subject matter
jurisdiction (addressed below), Plaintiffs finally argue that the precedent cited by NWS is either
not relevant or has been "effectively" overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court. The crucial word in
this argument is "effectively" because Plaintiffs concede that no case cited by NWS has actually
been overruled. In point of fact, the cases cited by NWS are both on point and good law.
The first case cited by NWS that Plaintiffs take exception with is Mahoney, 96 Idaho 59,
524 P.2d 187. In Mahoney, Idaho sought to impose a sales tax on the sale of cigarettes on a
retailer owned by a Coeur d' Alene tribal member located on the Coeur d' Alene reservation. The

Mahoney Court looked at where the incidence of the tax fell and identified it as falling on the
Indian retailer. The Court stated: "the incidence of the tax falls squarely upon sales by an Indian
on a reservation; this tax is nothing less than a direct tax upon commerce with the Indian tribes,
and 'such taxation is not permissible absent congressional consent.'" Id. at 64,524 P.2d at 192.
The Court then held that "[i]n the absence of congressional consent, the Idaho State Tax
Commission had no jurisdiction to tax the on-reservation sale of cigarettes by an Indian seller,
whether the purchasers were Indians or non-Indians.,,8 Id. at 67, 524 P.2d at 195 (citing U.S.
Const. Art. 1. § 8, d. 3). Plaintiffs argue that Mahoney has been effectively overruled by Ramah

The only portion of Mahoney that has been addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court relates to non-Indians. In
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 151 (1980), the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a State "may impose at lease 'minimal' burdens on the Indian retailer to aid in enforcing and
collecting the tax" on non-Indians. Obviously, this holding has no bearing on the present case as NWS is a
wholesaler selling to a retailer and both NWS and Warpath are Indians. Contrary to Plaintiffs' argument, Mahoney
has not been overruled for the points cited by NWS, and the holding that the Idaho State Tax Commission has no
jurisdiction to tax on-reservations sales of cigarettes to Indians is still good law.
8
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Navajo School Board, Inc., v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982), and
Cotton Petroleum Corp.,490 U.S. 163.
Ramah is neither on point nor persuasive. First, Ramah addressed whether federal law

preempts a state tax imposed on the gross receipts "a non-Indian construction company" received
from a tribal school board.

Ramah, 458 U.S. at 834 (emphasis added). In Mahoney, as in this

case, the party subject to taxation was an Indian. Mahoney, 96 Idaho at 60, 524 P.2d at 188.
This fact alone distinguishes Ramah from Mahoney and this case. Second, the Ramah Court
employed the Bracker test in reaching its conclusion. Ramah, 458 U.S. at 837. As discussed
above, the district court's failure to even address the Bracker test, by itself, requires reversing the
summary judgment. Indeed, Ramah's utilization of the Bracker test attests to the correctness of
NWS's position that Bracker should have been employed by the district court. Finally, the
Ramah Court held that the state tax at issue was preempted by Federal law, which is consistent

with what NWS asks this Court to hold. If anything, Ramah supports NWS' s assertions in this
case.
Despite the fact that Ramah supports NWS' s position, Plaintiffs cite to Ramah for the
proposition that "the Indian Commerce Clause does not preempt state law." (Respondent's
Brief, p. 23). This statement is simply false. The Ramah Court specifically noted that it is
invalid for a state tax commission to argue that a state tax is not preempted simply "because
federal statutes and regulations do not specifically express the intention to" preempt. Ramah,
458 U.S. at 843. In fact, the only issue in Ramah that is arguably even tangential to Plaintiffs'
argument is the Ramah Court's rejection of the dormant Indian Commerce Clause espoused by
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the Solicitor General. [d. at 845. However, in rejecting the Solicitor General's recommendation,
the Ramah Court noted that the Court's previous decisions "provide sufficient guidance to state
courts" and admonished New Mexico for giving "short shrift" to the principles outlined in
Bracker. Id. at 846. This guidance is especially important in this case because the district court

did not employ the Bracker test. It is respectfully submitted that Ramah supports and advances
NWS's argument, and that it does not detract from Mahoney in the least.
The Plaintiffs' reliance on Cotton Petroleum Corp., 490 U.S. 163 is even more
misplaced. In Cotton Petroleum, the entity being taxed was a non- Indian leasing land located on
a reservation. Id. at 169.

Once again, the U.S. Supreme Court in Cotton Petroleum employed

the Bracker test to determine whether the tax in question was preempted by federal law. [d. at
185. Unlike Ramah, the Cotton Petroleum Court held that the balance of interests weighs in
favor of New Mexico under Bracker and upheld the tax in question. [d. at 187. Based upon this
holding, Plaintiffs come to the conclusion that Cotton Petroleum stands for the proposition that
"federal law does not bar a State from imposing cigarette taxes upon on-reservation sales to
nonmembers of the tribe." (Respondent's Brief, p. 23).
The flaw in this analysis is that Plaintiffs seek to tax Indians, not nonmembers. This fact
undermines Plaintiffs' position because (1) the inquiry into the nature of the tribal interest at
stake is heightened, Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145, and (2) the legal incidence of the tax falls on an
Indian.

Goodman Oil, 136 Idaho at 60, 28 P.3d at 1003. This misapprehension results in

Plaintiffs wrongly concluding that Ramah and Cotton Petroleum are somehow persuasive to the
facts of the present case. What Plaintiffs and the district court fail to acknowledge, however, is

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 16
00408531.000

that the regulation involved in this case falls squarely on a tribe member located on a reservation.
Further, the district court failed to employ the Bracker test as mandated by both Ramah and
Cotton Petroleum. It is respectfully submitted that not only do Plaintiffs cite to Ramah and
Cotton Petroleum for incorrect propositions, but Ramah and Cotton Petroleum support NWS's
position.

C.

Idaho Does Not Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Regulate the Trade of Tobacco
in Indian Country.
NWS submits that the Idaho Constitution, federal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1360(a», and the

Idaho complementary jurisdictional statutes prohibit Idaho from exercising subject matter
jurisdiction over Indian Country, save for narrow exceptions or where the tribe has consented to
Idaho exercising jurisdiction. Here, the narrow exceptions do not apply, and Plaintiffs have not
demonstrated that the Coeur d'Alene tribe consented to Idaho exercising jurisdiction over the
tobacco trade conducted exclusively within the Coeur d' Alene reservation.
Plaintiffs' sole argument in response to NWS's subject matter jurisdiction defense is that
Idaho has subject matter jurisdiction because there is no "reservation-to-reservation" immunity
for cigarette sales. NWS has not made any such argument, and quite frankly, this seems to be a
red herring argument advanced for the purpose of distracting the Court from the clear lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs maintain that "who actually receives the cigarettes and where in the State they
are actually received is of no legal import." (Respondent's Brief, p. 20). This argument flouts
well-established law.

Surely, Plaintiffs recognize that on-reservation conduct is subject to
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different laws and rules than off-reservation conduct. It is axiomatic that "where" goods are
delivered has legal significance. Second, "who" receives the goods is also significant based
upon the principle that when on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue, state law
is generally inapplicable. Plaintiffs' dismissal of the "where" and the "who" is as wrong as it
sounds.
Even though Plaintiffs argue the "who" is not relevant, Plaintiffs then state that it is
"crucial to understand that [Warpath] is not a member of an Indian tribe but is instead an Idaho
corporation created pursuant to Idaho law." (Respondent's Brief, p. 20). If, by Plaintiffs' own
words, "who actually receives the cigarettes ... is of no legal import" then why is it "crucial to
understand that [Warpath] is not a member of an Indian tribe"? Moreover, Plaintiffs simply
ignore Idaho precedent holding that businesses exclusively owned by tribal members are
considered Indians in analyzing whether Idaho can regulate the transaction. Mahoney, 96 Idaho
at 61, 524 P.2d at 189. It is respectfully submitted that Plaintiffs' entire argument regarding the
so called "reservation-to-reservation" immunity is misplaced.
As noted in NWS's initial brief, Section 19, Article XXI of the Idaho Constitution states:
And the people of the State of Idaho do agree and declare that we
forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public
lands lying within the boundaries thereof, and to all lands lying
within said limits owned or held by any Indians or Indian tribes;
and until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the
United States, the same shall be subject to the disposition of the
United States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the
absolute jurisdiction and control of the congress of the United
States . ...
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Based upon this constitutional provision and Idaho Code § 67-5101, which the legislature
enacted to accept jurisdiction in Indian County over specific types of disputes,9 NWS submitted
that the Idaho Constitution prohibits Idaho from exercising subject matter jurisdiction in this case
because NWS's conduct occurred solely in Indian Country.

In response to this assertion,

Plaintiffs simply state that the U.S. Supreme Court has '''recognized the rights of States, absent a
congressional prohibition, to exercise criminal (and, implicitly, civil) jurisdiction over nonIndians located on reservation lands.,,,10 (Respondent's Brief, p. 21) (citations omitted). This
statement fails to address that the Idaho Constitution specifically cedes control of Indian County
to the "congress of the United States."
Moreover, Plaintiffs' argument that U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the rights of
States to exercise civil jurisdiction is misleading. With its exclusive jurisdictional control over
Indian lands, Congress has ceded jurisdiction to certain states, which include:

Alaska,

California, Minnesota (except the Red Lake Reservation), Nebraska, Oregon (except the Warm
Springs Reservation), and Wisconsin. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a). Idaho is not one of these States.
Congress has also allowed other states to accept jurisdiction with the consent of the tribe. I 1 25

Such disputes include compulsory school attendance; juvenile delinquency and youth rehabilitation; dependent,
neglected and abused children; insanities and mental illnesses; public assistance; domestic relations; and operation
and management of motor vehicles upon highways and roads maintained by the county or state, or political
subdivisions thereof. State v. Marek, 112 Idaho 860, 865-66, 736 P.2d 1313, 1319-20 (1987).
10 Plaintiffs also respond to this assertion by arguing that Marek, 112 Idaho 860, 736 P.2d 1314, is not on point
because the Commentary Act "applies merely to the act of introducing cigarettes into Idaho for the purpose of
distribution or sale." This argument misses the point. NWS cited to Marek because it supports NWS's assertion
that Idaho is prohibited from exercising subject matter jurisdiction in this case, not because of where the incidence
of the tax falls.
II For instance, the Colville tribe consented in 1965 to the State of Washington's assumption of jurisdiction over it,
and Washington has assumed total jurisdiction only over tribes that have so consented. Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,164 (1980)
9
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U.S.c. §§ 1321, 1322. Notably, the Coeur d' Alene Indian Reservation has not consented to the
State of Idaho's assumption of jurisdiction over it.
Further, many of the cases Plaintiffs rely upon are from states where Congress has given
jurisdiction back to the State, Acosta v. San Diego County, 126 Cal.App.2d 455 (Cal. App.
1954); Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Rd. OJ Equalization, 800 F.2d 1446 (9 th Cir.
1986); People v. Native Wholesale Supply, 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 257 (Cal. App. 2011), or States that

do not have constitutional provisions that are similarly worded to Idaho's Constitution. Wagnon,
546 U.S. 95 (Kansas's Constitution only waives the right to tax the United States' title in the
land and does not grant "absolute jurisdiction" to Congress and has no Indian land provision in
its constitution). Critically, Plaintiffs have not provided any authority for the proposition that
Idaho can expand its jurisdictional authority without the consent of the affected tribe. To the
contrary, "Idaho cannot expand its jurisdiction without the consent of the affected Tribes." Knox
v. State, 148 Idaho 324, 332, 223 P.3d 266, 274 (2009).

Because Congress has not ceded

jurisdiction of Indian County to Idaho and the Coeur d' Alene Indian Reservation has not
consented to the State of Idaho's assumption of jurisdiction over it, Plaintiffs' arguments that
Idaho has civil jurisdiction is simply incorrect.
In summation, Plaintiffs' arguments regarding subject matter jurisdiction fail to address
the Idaho Constitution and Idaho law. Instead, Plaintiffs assert that the Complementary Act
gives the State of Idaho subject matter jurisdiction in this case. (Respondents' Brief, p.
16). This fails to recognize that the Idaho Constitution gives jurisdiction over Indian lands to
Congress, and Idaho can only again obtain jurisdiction through those methods approved by
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Congress. Plaintiffs also misinterpret Marek, which recognized that Congress only ceded partial
jurisdiction back to Idaho, and unless Congress formally cedes more jurisdiction, Idaho lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over Indian Country. Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that
this Court find that the district court erred when it failed to grant NWS's Motion to Dismiss.

D.

Idaho Lacks Personal Jurisdiction over NWS.
In its initial brief, NWS submitted that Idaho does not have personal jurisdiction over

NWS under either Idaho's long arm statute or the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Plaintiffs challenge both of these assertions.

A closer examination at Plaintiffs' analysis,

however, reveals that Plaintiffs' argument is meritless.

1.

Idaho's long-arm statute does not confer personal jurisdiction over NWS.

Idaho's long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction in cases where the defendant transacted
business within Idaho, I.C. § 5-514(a), or where the defendant committed a tort within the Idaho.

I.e.

§ 5-514(b). Plaintiffs admit that these are the only two provisions under the long-arm statute

that might conceivably subject NWS to personal jurisdiction in Idaho. (Respondent's Brief, p.
27).
Plaintiffs assert that NWS's allege violation of the Complementary Act and Cigarette Tax
Acts "constitute the commission of a tortious act under" Idaho Code section 5-514(b).
(Respondent's Brief, p. 30).

Plaintiffs do not cite any authority for the proposition that an

individual or a company can commit a tort against the government by simply violating a tax
statute. Likewise, Defendant could not find any such authority. This is most likely because a
tort is defined as a "civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained." Black's Law Dictionary,
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p. 629 (1996). In the present case, Plaintiffs allege that NWS violated escrow/tax statutes. Such
a violation is not a tort. Plaintiffs' argument is akin to stating that a violation of the criminal
code is a tort, which is certainly incorrect. It is respectfully submitted that the long-arm statute
does not confer jurisdiction in this case under section 5-514(b) because there are no facts
supporting an assertion that NWS committed a tortious act in Idaho.
With respect to the transaction of business within Idaho, Plaintiffs cite to two cases where
a manufacturer of goods was subject to jurisdiction in Idaho under the long-arm statute. In the
present case, however, NWS is not a manufacturer of goods. Rather, the cigarettes sold by NWS
are manufactured by Grand River. (R. p. 15). Accordingly, the cases cited by Plaintiffs are
irrelevant.
Significantly, this Court has stated that "sales occurring within the boundaries of an
Indian reservation [are] not sales occurring within Idaho's domain." Mahoney, 96 Idaho at
62, 524 P.2d at 190 (emphasis added). This law is based upon the Idaho Constitution, which
provides that "Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the
congress of the United States." Idaho Constitution, Article 21, § 19. Plaintiffs attempt to
distinguish Mahoney by arguing that it was not decided "in the context of determining personal
jurisdiction." (Respondent's Brief, p. 35). With respect to the Idaho Constitution, Plaintiffs
simply state that it does not "defeat a finding of personal jurisdiction." Id. Essentially, Plaintiffs
apparently urge this Court to simply ignore its prior precedent and the Idaho Constitution in
resolving the personal jurisdiction issue. It is respectfully submitted that neither this Court's
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prior precedent nor the Idaho Constitution can simply be ignored as easily as Plaintiffs would
like.
The simple fact is that this Court and Idaho's founding fathers determined that Indian
reservations are not part of Idaho's domain and instead are regulated by the federal government.
Based upon Idaho law, the record is devoid of any conduct occurring in Idaho that could subject
NWS to personal jurisdiction in Idaho under Idaho's long-arm statute because NWS has no
presence in Idaho. Accordingly, this Court should find as a matter of law that NWS is not
subject to personal jurisdiction under Idaho's long-arm statute.

2.

The Due Process Clause does not confer personal jurisdiction over NWS.

Similar to its long-arm statute analysis, Plaintiffs once again ignore this Court's
precedent and the Idaho Constitution in arguing that NWS has directed its activities towards
Idaho when NWS's sole connection with Idaho is via a reservation located within the state. As
discussed above, based upon the laws of Idaho, NWS has no connection in Idaho whatsoever
because "sales occurring within the boundaries of an Indian reservation [are] not sales occurring
within Idaho's domain."

In addition to ignoring Idaho law, Plaintiffs also speculate that NWS' s cigarette sales
have "off-reservation effects." (Respondent's Brief, p. 31). This statement, however, is pure
speculation by Plaintiffs because only two instances of sales to non-Indians are of record.
Moreover, any NWS cigarettes that may have arrived within Idaho's jurisdiction arrived there by
the unilateral acts of the consumer and not by the purposeful availment of NWS.
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E.

Plaintiffs' Are Not Entitled to Attorneys' Fees.
Plaintiffs request attorneys' fees under Idaho Code § 39-8407(5). As Plaintiffs correctly

note, however, attorneys' fees are only recoverable if Plaintiffs prevail. As set forth above, the
district court's rulings should be overturned based upon well-established law. It is respectfully
submitted that if this Court agrees with NWS on any point raised herein, that Plaintiffs are not
entitled to attorneys' fees either on appeal or below.

III.

CONCLUSION

The Complementary Act and the Cigarette Tax Act attempt to regulate conduct between
Indians on a reservation. Based upon the Indian Commerce Clause and Bracker, such regulation
is impermissible.

A faithful interpretation of the Idaho Constitution also bars Idaho from

exercising subject matter jurisdiction over Indian Country, which precludes Idaho from obtaining
subject matter jurisdiction in this case. Finally, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that NWS is
subject to personal jurisdiction in Idaho under either Idaho's long-arm statute or the Due Process
Clause. For these reasons, the judgment of the district court granting Plaintiffs' request for
summary judgment, granting Plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction, granting Plaintiffs'
request for civil penalties, and granting Plaintiffs' request for attorney fees should be reversed.
Likewise, the judgment of the district court denying NWS' s Motion to Dismiss should also be
overturned.
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DATED this

ZL day of February, 2012.
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